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A Schumpeterian Model of Growth in the World





he traditional theory of international economics explaining
trade bycomparative advantage and differences in endowment
in the Heckscher-Ohlin approach experienced a major innova-
tion in the seventies when imperfect competition was explicitly intro-
duced into the models ofinternational specialization. Imperfect com-
petition is due to two factors: economies ofscale in production and
product variety in the preference function of consumers implying
heterogeneity ofproducts. Whereas economies ofscale allow a reduc-
tion ofcosts atlarger production quantities and thus are a driving force
for larger firms to develop, product variety and consumer preferences
for specific products limit the market niche or the monopolistic or
oligopolistic market section ofafirm [Helpman and Krugman, 1985].
In such a setting, strategic behavior offirms especially with respect to
an early start and market entry plays an important role. If, however,
markets are open and contestable, market power ofexisting finns is
checked by new entrants or by substitution with other goods.
Economies of scale or increasing returns can be a factor of eco-
nomic growth [Romer, 1986]. Opening up aneconomy to trade allows
a widening of the market in the tradition of Adam Smith,
l the ex-
ploitation ofeconomies ofscale and a reduction ofproduction costs.
Remark: This note is an outgrowth of a review of Grossman and Helpman [1991 b],
promised to this journal. I appreciate comments from Bert Hofman, Karl-Heinz Paque
and Michael Stolpe.
1 "The increase of demand ... encourages production, and thereby increases the
competition ofthe producers, who, in order to undersell one another, have recourse to
new divisions of labour and new improvements of art, which might never otherwise
have been thought of." [Smith, 1937, p. 706].Siebert: A Schumpeterian Model ofGrowth in the World Economy 801
Thus, international trade contributes to economic growth which in a
closed economy can be explained in the Solow tradition [1956]. In an
open economy, the Solovian growth factors show up in the changes
in endowment, such as increases in the labor supply and capital ac-
cumulation.2
Technological knowledge (ifitis immobile) is one ofthefactors of
endowment, and the change in technology can be animportant aspect
ofalterations in the comparative advantage ofcountries. In the tradi-
tional theory ofinternational specialization, technical progress posi-
tively affects comparative advantage by making capital or labor (or
both) more productive. Endowment then is defined in efficiency units.
In these traditional models, technical progress is an exogenous factor.
Quite a few attemptswere made to explain technological change more
explicitly. For instance, Kaldor's [1957] embodiment effect stresses
the vintage aspect ofcapital with the latest vintage incorporating the
highest productivity. A similarconceptrelates tohumancapitalwhere
workers embody different technologicallevels depending ontheir age,
sectoral experience and education. Experience, such as training on the
job, plays a role for labor productivity; experience gained in accumu-
lated production or accumulated investment is also relevant for the
productivity of capital (learning by doing) [Arrow, 1962]. Vemon's
[1966] product cycle for the first time introduces an endogenous dy-
namic patternfrom the productionside where comparative advantage
eventually migrates from the innovating country to the imitating
country.
I. The Grossman-Helpman Model
Given this state of the literature on international economics,
Grossman and Helpman [1991 a] develop a Schumpeterian model of
endogenous technological change and economic growth ofthe world
economy.
Whereas changes in endowment with the traditional factors of
production influence comparative advantage and may increase the
gains from trade for a country, there is the property of diminishing
returns for the traditional factors in the production function. Con-
trasting inventions with the cultivation of land, Schumpeter [1942]
made the point that the cultivation of land will eventually run into
2 In addition, the extension ofthe economic space in the American tradition ofthe new
frontier [Hansen, 1956] is an important aspect ofeconomic growth.802 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
diminishing returns, but that "we cannot reason in this fashion about
the future possibilities oftechnological advance". In a Schumpeterian
tradition and in line with Romer [1986], Grossman and Helpman
[1991 a] claim that technological progress may not exhibit the prop-
erty ofdiminishing returns. Industrial innovation then is the engine of
economic growth in the world economy. Innovation itselfis the result
ofagents driven by profits, again a Schumpeteriancharacteristic. The
fascinating property of this approach is that it links trade and eco-
nomic growth. The structure ofthe model is explained in Figure 1.
Besides capital, there are two factors ofproduction in the model,
namely traditional or unskilled labor and human capital. To what
extent a worker has accumulated skills oris unskilled depends among
other factors on training on the job or education. There are three
activities in which unskilled labor and humanskills are used as inputs,
Figure 1 - Structure 0/ the Grossman-Helpman Model
Factors Activities Trade
Research and • Flow of
Development ~ Knowledge
Free1 Entry
Human Hi-Tech • Intra-Industry
~
Capital Manufacturing 4 Trade
Static Oligopoly with
Profit Opportunities
Unskilled Traditional ~ Inter-Industry
Labor
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however with different intensities: research and development, high-
tech manufacturing and traditional manufacturing. Research and de-
velopmentis aninputtohigh-tech manufacturing. Intraditionalman-
ufacturing, the production process exhibits constant returns to scale
and perfect competition prevails. In the high-tech sector, there is a
continuum ofindustries, and each industry is an oligopoly. The mar-
ket position of each high-tech firm depends on the research and
development input. Once the R &D input is determined, the oligo-
polistic structure in the product market is given. In that sense, the
oligopolies are static. Profits in high-tech manufacturing are the
targets oftheR&D industries. Thus, profit opportunitiesin the high-
tech sector drive the R&D process. In the R&D industry, free entry
prevails. R&D is an ordinary economic activity with a "production"
technology relating inputs to outputs (see below). Since profits are
expectedin high-tech manufacturing, one is preparedto incurupfront
costs for research and development in order to obtain an attractive
market position in the high-tech oligopoly.
There are four forms of exchange with other countries: Inter-in-
dustry trade oftraditional manufacturing can be explained along the
familiar lines ofthe Heckscher-Ohlin context ofcomparative advan-
tage and differences in factor endowment and for the case ofperfect
competition. Intertemporal trade is the analogue for inter-industry
trade with respect to time. A country with high savings (or a low time
preference rate) will export today and import tomorrow. A country
with a high marginal rate of transformation over time can import
today and export tomorrow. This links trade to capital flows. Oligo-
polistic competition in high-tech products explains intra-industry
trade. As a fourth mechanism there is the international flow oftech-
nical knowledge.
There are two approaches to model the high-tech sector: In the
variety model ofthe Dixit-Stiglitz type, innovation expands the set of
available goods thus allowing more variety by adding additional
products and increasing the choice to the consumers who Iike va'tiety.
Producers may like variety as weIl. The product set is enlarged hori-
zontally by adding products of a different variety. In this case, the
output of the R&D process is the design of a new, differentiated
product, i.e., a blueprint for new products (variety approach). In the
quality improvement model, products vertically move up a quality
ladder with each level on the ladder representing a higher quality. In
thiscase, the outputoftheR&Dindustryis the entrepreneur'sinstan-
taneous probability of achieving a research breakthrough, i. e., the804 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
next generation ofproducts. These different formulations ofthe high-
tech sector are used to model endogenous technical change.
In adynamie general equilibrium model with firms maximizing
profits and households maximizing utility the equilibria are deter-
mined. Agents have rational expectations. In Bertrand price competi-
tion ofa static oligopoly with constant returns to scale market entry
is determined endogenously. There is always the potential threat that
a newcomer will enter the market ifa price higher than the limit price
is established.
There are some interesting results in the Grossman-Helpman
model. Thus, the variety model in static oligopoly for the high tech
sector yields mark-up pricing for aCES utility function with constant
elasticities ofdemand. In the quality improvement model with perfect
substitutes, there is a limit-pricing equilibrium. The variety model
yields the well-known condition
n/v + v/v = r ,
i. e., the dividend rate (profits 1t over capital value v) andcapital gains
(v/v) as a yield on physical capital must be equal to the interest rate.
ß. Non-Rivalry of Knowledge Capital
Following a concept similar to Romer [1986], innovation has a
by-product in raising the stock of knowledge capital. Knowledge
capitalis a public good, i. e., itis non-rivalrous[Romer, 1990] andonly
imperfectly excludable so that innovations of a specific firm have a
positive externality. Depending on the type ofextemality, innovation
becomes a driving force for growth, and R&D expenditures of the
individual firms contribute to general knowledge and to the benefit of
society as a whole.
In the Grossman-Helpman model, knowledge capital is an input
in the production function of R&D. In the models with product
innovation,i.e., enlargingtheproductset, researchnotonly produces
a patentable blueprint or design for its perpetrator but also increases
the stock ofknowledge ofthe economy, and this stock ofknowledge
is non-appropriable. Knowledge capital is a public input. In the mod-
els with quality upgrading, it is assumed that research activities can
enter the race for the next generation technology even from scratch.
This is equivalent to assuming ubiquity ofblueprint knowledge ofthe
current generation.Siebert: A Schumpeterian Model ofGrowth in the World Economy 805
An alternative approach is to collapse the R&D sector with the
high-tech sector and to model the production function as a linear
homogeneous production function with respect to the traditional in-
puts and include knowledge capital K as a general input besides
physical capital k [Romer, 1986; Helpman, 1988]. Note that the non-
rivalry of K implies that the production function does not exhibit
constant returns with respect to all factors. Setting the current value
ofa unit ofcapital equal to 1, asset market equilibrium requires that
the present value ofmarginal return (left-hand side ofequation 1) is
equal to the current value ofcapital, Le.,
00
Se-[R(~) - R(t)]Ä [k(r), K(r)] dr = 1.
t




requiring that the real interest rate is equal to the marginal productiv-
ity of capital.
The marginal productivity ofcapital now not only depends on the
capital stock, but on knowledge capital stock K. Thus, investment (or
innovation) ofa firm is considered to contribute to knowledge capital.
For blueprints, this link between innovation and knowledge capital
depends on the patent system as a specific property right; for human
capital, it also depends on the extent to which qualified laboris indus-
try-specific or not.
111. Implications for International Specialization
For the international division of labor, the Grossman-Helpman
model suggests that a country richly endowed with human capitalwill
specialize in research and development. Having a comparative advan-
tage in the production ofan input for high-tech products, the country
will ultimately export high-tech products which is consistent with the
Heckscher-Ohlin approach (only explicitly considering R&D as an
intennediate input). Countries endowed with unskilled laborwill spe-
cialize in the production oftraditional goods. Thus, the initial endow-
ment determines the specialization among high-tech and traditional
products.
3 Assuming R(t) = r(t).806 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
If a country is ahead in a high-tech product and if there is no
important international spillover in knowledge capital, the country
has an advantage in the next period. Thus, there is the advantage of
an early start. This also holds for firms. It pays for the firm to be
established early in the market and by being there to make it harder
for a newcomer to entere
One way to look at the world is to view the North as the center of
innovation with a competitive race between Japan, North America
and Europe andinterpret the South as imitatingproducts thateventu-
ally are substituted by a betterquality productproducedin theNorth.
With the diffusion of knowledge capital, endowment with unskilled
labor becomes more relevant as a cost factor and comparative advan-
tage with respect to specific products migrates to the South.
I~ Growth and Spartal Structure
Ifthe internationalspillover is negligible andifinnovation and the
accumulation of physical capital only contribute to national knowl-
edge capital, a country may become a growth pole in the sense of
Perroux [1961]; other countries may lag behind. Such a specialization
between countries may become persistent and spatial hysteresis may
result. Thus, equation (2) may explain economic geography [Krug-
man, 1991]. The immobile knowledge capital represents a factor of
crystallization attracting the mobile factor [Siebert, 1969]. This ap-
proach can be extended to vicious circles and circular causation
[Myrdal, 1971]. The approach can also incorporate a system ofrings
around an agglomeration in the von-Thünen tradition; the system of
rings changes in a Schumpeterian process ofpopulation growth, tech-
nical change and capital accumulation [Giersch, 1983].
Historically, however, we have also examples thatcountries do not
get locked into a favorable or an unfavorable position. One aspect is
that endowments are not necessarily static but change over time such
as the capital stock through savings and investment, human skills
through education, environmental scarcity through improved abate-
ment technology and technical knowledge through innovation. Thus,
a latecomer has a chance to catch up, for instance by specializing on
a more modern product relative to its riyal. Germany in the 19th
century relative to Britain, Japan after 1945 and some ofthe Pacific
Rim countries in the last twenty years are cases in point.
The optimality condition in equation (2) can be interpreted in
different ways. Let k be the capital stock of a country and K theSiebert: A Schumpeterian Model ofGrowth in the World Economy 807
knowledge capital of the world. Then national economies of scale
have a positive externality for the world, i. e., the knowledge capital of
the world is interpreted as having a positive effect on national output
[Ethier, 1988]. This hinges on the diffusion of technical knowledge.
This approach may not only be interpreted from the point ofview of
a productionfunction (for instance throughlearning bydoing) butthe
approach mayaiso include the size ofthe market. Then the size ofthe
world market, symbolized by K, influences production costs. For
instance, an intra-firm division oflabor may be organized worldwide
and a specific national industry may have an advantage by being
established internationally. Or a national firm may benefit from
knowledge capital being available on a worldwide scale. This effect of
K on the national productivity of capital captures some of Adam
Smith's aspects of the dynamic gains from trade.
Equation (2) mayaiso be interpreted for a specific national firm
with a firm-specific capital stock k and a capital stock K of the
national industry. Then, the production function ofthe firm exhibits
constant returns to scale, but the capital stock ofthe industry gener-
ates positive externalities (for other firms). This interpretation may
also be applied in a regional context. This implies increasing returns
at the industry level. An agglomeration of firms in a region may
establish a market of qualified labor thus enhancing the production
possibilities of individual firms. Workers receiving training by one
firm may be hired by other firms, so that there is a pool ofqualified
labor. Forthe individual worker a region becomes attractive ifhecan
cover some of his employment risks by the option of working for
another firm in the same region without migrating. Examples are the
Swiss watch industry in the Swiss Jura and precision engineering in
Baden-Württemberg. Once specific qualifications are available in a
region, the human capital can give birth to new industries.
In this context, the distinction between mobile and immobile
Schumpeter industries is interesting [Klodt, 1991]. The Schumpeter
industry is generally characterized as a high-skill industry. In the
mobile Schumpeter industry, R&D can be separated from produc-
tion. Examples are the electronic and computer industry where re-
search is the human-skill-intensive activity which can be undertaken
without a feedback from production. In the immobile Schumpeter
industry, R&D interacts with production, especially because learning
by doing in production occurs having a feedback on R&D. Produc-
tion of airplanes is a case in point.808 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
~ The Empirical Evidence
To what extent the paradigm of endogenous technical change is
supported by the empirical facts, is animportantissue. Here are some
ofthe stylized facts:
(i) In contrast to declining per capita growth rates in an economy
with capital accumulation (due to declining productivities with a
larger capital stock, i. e., moving down the marginal productivity
schedule), Grossman and Helpman [1991 b, p. 1] claim that
"growth in per capita income has been sustained at positive and
apparently non-declining rates in many countries for prolonged
periods of time". Looking at growth since 1700, Romer [1986,
p. 1012] concludes that "growth rates appear to be increasing not
only as a function ofcalendar time but also as a function ofthe
level ofdevelopment". For the United States, the growth rate of
real percapita GDPhas increased from 0.58 in 1800-1840to 2.47
in 1960-1978 [Romer, 1986, Table 2]. This points to some en-
dogenous vitality in the long-run growth process.4
(ii) Open economies have a better growth performance than closed
economies. Outward-oriented countries have done betterinterms
ofgrowth thancountries with a focus onimportsubstitution. The
Latin American experience based on the Prebisch paradigm
[1959] ofimport substitution and protecting infant expott indus-
tries is ample proof of the proposition when compared to the
experience ofthe South-East Asian countries. Openness ensures
competition, and competition reduces costs and induces to find
new technical knowledge.
(iii) Growth rates vary considerably across countries in a given time
period. Over a longtime period, differentcountrieshave takenthe
leading position in the growth process [Maddison, 1983]. This
points to the fact that economic growth may slow down in a
country. It is open to what extent resource constraints, for in-
stance resource availability and environmental constraints in the
seventies and eighties, take their effect. At least, a high growth
rate today is not a guarantee for a high growth rate tomorrow. In
this context, it seems to be an open question to what extent
countries with a lower income level catch up with the leading
country.
4 It is an open question to what extent the productivity malaise in the seventies and
eighties is an exception.Siebert: A Schumpeterian Model ofGrowth in the World Economy 809
(iv) Inorderto show the empiricalvalidity oftheGrossman-Helpman
approach one would have to establish a eiear relationship be-
tween technical change and output growth which requires to
clearly isolate the inputs and the outputin the production ofnew
technology (and human capital).
VI. Policy Implications
What are the policy implications ofthis new line ofresearch? An
important implication is that openness matters. In addition to the
traditional argument that international trade creates benefits by re-
ducing the opportunity costs ofobtaining a good, the world provides
a larger market, and a larger market reduces costs through economies
ofscale. Moreover, the intensity ofcompetition will be increased in a
larger market. The contestability in high-tech manufacturing may
take the form ofcompetition in the R&D industry.
Should a country undertake strategie trade policy [Brander and
Spencer, 1985] in order to have the benefit of an early start and to
position its industry? The problem with this policy ofrent creation by
export subsidies is that strategie trade policy is sector specific. This
also holds for industrial targeting by sector specific stimulation ofthe
technical process where the government mustpick the winner ex ante.
The government, however, does not have sufficient information on
the future state ofthe world; thus, strategie trade policy rules out the
exploratorypowerofcompetition[Hayek, 1968]. Inaddition, itcanbe
expected that the potential gains from rent creation, if they can be
established in a robust way [Siebert, 1988], will be eaten up by ineffi-
ciencies ofgovernment intervention.
A more fruitful policy conclusion is to stimulate the conditions for
inventions and innovations as weIl as human capital formation more
generally. This can be achieved by allowing write-offs for R&D in a
general way that is not industry specific, stimulating basic research
and building up an efficient educational system, including vocational
training.
Improving the general conditions for innovation and human cap-
italformation is inlinewith theparadigmoflocationalorinstitutional
competition [Siebert, 1991]. According to this concept, some factors
ofendowment influencing trade and growth are given; others can be
influenced by policy and represent acquired comparative advantage.
Thus, a country may influence its state of technology or its capital810 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
stock in the long run. One specific aspect oflocational competition is
that immobile factors ofendowment define locational advantage and
thus determine to what extent mobile factors can be attracted to a
country. An important policy instrument is the provision of public
goods; then the issue arises how national public goods can be inte-
grated into the economic theory of international trade [Clarida and
Findlay, 1991]. The provision ofpublic goods is not the whole story
because public goods have to be financed, for instance by taxation.
Thus, institutional competition relates to a broad spectrum ofprob-
lems including environmental policy as weIl as the financing ofpublic
goods through user charges or the private provision of supposedly
public goods.
Another policy issne that arises from the new line ofresearch in
international economics is how property rights for knowledge capital
mnst be defined so that an optimal process ofendogenous technical
change is stimulated. Whereas human capital is embodied in people,
knowledge on new processes and design is, in principle, ubiquitous.
Property rights for knowledge capital mustprovide enoughincentives
to stimulate research and development as well as innovation; but at
the same time product markets should be kept open so that newcom-
ers can entere The correct incentive may be found in a temporary
patent granting a monopoly position; the openness ofmarkets can be
established by discontinuing the patent and making the knowledge
generally available after the patent periode
An institutional arrangement ofintellectual property can be con-
sidered as a specific aspect of competition policy aiming at keeping
competition alive and markets open. This poses an unresolved ques-
tion with firms operating in the world market and competition policy
being undertaken by national governments or regional integrations
such as the EC.
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